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Governance and Private Investment in the Middle East and North Africa

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Author Info

  • Ahmet Faruk Aysan

    (Departement Economie - Université Bocarici)

  • M.-K. Nabli

    (Departement Economie - Université Bocarici)

  • Marie-Ange Veganzones

    (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of the low level of private investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with special emphasis on the role of governance. Based on the existing literature, we have categorized what types of governance institutions are more detrimental to entrepreneurial investments. We have then estimated a simultaneous model of private investment and governance quality where economic policies concurrently explain both variables. Our empirical results show that governance plays a significant role in private investment decisions. This result is particularly true in the case of “Administrative Quality” in the form of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly profile of administration, and law and order, as well as for “Political Stability”. Evidence in favor of “Public Accountability” seems, however, less robust. Our estimations also stress that structural reforms -- such as financial development and trade openness – and human development affect private investment decisions directly, and/or through their positive impact on governance. These findings bring new empirical evidence on the subject of private investment in the developing world and in MENA countries in particular.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00557250.

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Date of creation: 18 Jan 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00557250

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Keywords: governance; private investment; institutions; Middle East and North Africa.;

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Cited by:
  1. Dalila NICET-CHENAF (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113) & Eric ROUGIER (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113), 2009. "FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue," Cahiers du GREThA 2009-13, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
  2. José Aixalá & Gema Fabro, 2009. "Economic freedom, civil liberties, political rights and growth: a causality analysis," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 165-178, September.
  3. Alaya MAROUANE (Université de Tunis) & Dalila NICET-CHENAF (GREThA-GRES) & Eric ROUGIER (GREThA-GRES), 2008. "The law of growth and attraction: an endogenous model of absorptive capacities, FDI and income for MENA countries," Cahiers du GRES 2008-21, Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales.
  4. Enowbi Batuo, Michael & Fabro, Gema, 2009. "Economic Development, Institutional Quality and Regional integration: Evidence from Africa Countries," MPRA Paper 19069, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Ahmet Faruk Aysan & Zeynep Ersoy & M-A Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007. "Does the Perception of Governance Institutions Matter for Private Investment: The Case of Middle East and North Africa," Working Papers 2007/03, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
  6. Rafael Alexis Acevedo Rueda & José U. Mora Mora, 2008. "Sociopolitical and judicial factors as determinants of private investment in Latin America," Economía, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (IIES). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales. Universidad de Los Andes. Mérida, Venezuela, vol. 33(26), pages 93-118, july-dece.

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