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Are Endowments Fate?

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Author Info
Nugent, Jeffrey B
Robinson, James A

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Abstract

In recent theories of comparative development the role of institutional differences has been crucial. Yet what explains comparative institutional evolution? We investigate this issue by studying the coffee exporting economies of Latin America. While homogeneous in many ways, they experienced radically different paths of economic (and political) development which is conventional traced to the differential organization of the coffee industry. We show that the different forms that the coffee economy took in the 19th century was critically determined by the legal environment determining access to land, and that different laws resulted from differences in the nature of political competition. Our analysis suggests that explanations of institutional differences that stress economic fundamentals can only be part of the story. At least in the economies we study, while geography, factor endowments and technology are clearly important, their implications for the institutional structure and thus development are conditional on the form that political competition takes in society. Endowments are not fate.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3206.

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Date of creation: Feb 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3206

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Related research
Keywords: development; inequality; organization; political economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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  1. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "Modeling Inefficient Institutions," NBER Working Papers 11940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Adenew, Berhanu & Gebre-Selassie, Samuel & Nega, Berhanu, 2003. "Tenure security and land-related investment - evidence from Ethiopia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2991, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2006. "Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21465, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Raffaella Castagnini & Klaus Deininger & Maria A. Gonzalez, 2004. "Comparing land reform and land markets in colombia: impacts on equity and efficiency," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3258, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Galor, Oded & Moav, Omer & Vollrath, Dietrich, 2008. "Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions and the Great Divergence," CEPR Discussion Papers 6751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2004. "Land Inequality and the Origin of Divergence and Overtaking in the Growth Process," GE, Growth, Math methods 0410004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Daron Acemoglu, 2003. "The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies," NBER Working Papers 10037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Evans, Peter, 2006. "Extending the 'Institutional' Turn: Property, Politics and Development Trajectories," Working Papers RP2006/113, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  9. Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2004. "Does greater accountability improve the quality of delivery of public services? Evidence from Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3277, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 217-232, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Cem Karayalcin, 2005. "Divided We Stand, United We Fall: The Hume-Weber-Jones Mechanism for the Rise of Europe," Working Papers 0509, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Luís Vaz Silva, 2005. "Geography, European Settlements and Compared Development in the Americas," Working Papers 200518, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  13. Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2006. "Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions, and Great Divergence," Working Papers 2006-14, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Sumiter Broca, 2002. "Food Insecurity, Poverty and Agriculture: A Concept Paper," Working Papers 02-15, Agricultural and Development Economics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO - ESA). [Downloadable!]
  15. Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2005. "The Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions in the Process of Development," GE, Growth, Math methods 0508008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  16. Jonathan Conning, 2002. "Latifundia Economics," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 02/1, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2005. "Land Inequality and the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions," Development and Comp Systems 0502018, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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