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Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms

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  • Hunt, Jennifer
  • Laszlo, Sonia

Abstract

We use data on households’ bribery of public officials in Peru and Uganda to analyze the distribution by income of the burden of bribery, the mechanisms leading to it, and the payoffs to bribery. We show the burden of bribery is not borne disproportionately by the poor. Among bribers, the poor do pay a greater share of their income than the rich, but the rich use officials more often, and among users, the rich are more likely to bribe. The benefit of bribery is avoidance of the poor service delivered to clients who refuse to bribe.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

Volume (Year): 40 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 355-372

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Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:2:p:355-372

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

Related research

Keywords: bribery; corruption; Peru; Uganda; Latin America; Africa;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Justesen, Mogens K. & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2014. "Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 106-115.
  2. Michaël Aklin & Patrick Bayer & S. Harish & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "Who blames corruption for the poor enforcement of environmental laws? Survey evidence from Brazil," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 16(3), pages 241-262, July.
  3. Timothy Hinks & Artjoms Ivlevs, 2014. "Communist party membership and bribe paying in transitional economies," Working Papers 20141401, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
  4. Timothy Hinks & Artjoms Ivlevs, 2012. "Bribing Behaviour and Sample Selection: Evidence from Post-Socialist countries and Western Europe," Working Papers 20121208, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
  5. Estrin, Saul & Korosteleva, Julia & Mickiewicz, Tomasz, 2013. "Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial growth aspirations?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 564-580.

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