The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
AbstractIn 2004, the Hugo Ch�vez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters who had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Ch�vez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Ch�vez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.3 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. (JEL D72, O17)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.
Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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- Eva Meyersson Milgrom, 2010. "The Dispossessed: A Labor-Market Analysis of Extreme Political Violence," Discussion Papers 09-007, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Flochel, Thomas & Straub, Stéphane, 2011.
"Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Flochel, Thomas & Straub, Stéphane, 2011. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," TSE Working Papers 11-224, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Flochel, Thomas & Straub, Stéphane, 2011. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," IDEI Working Papers 661, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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