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Harassment, corruption and tax policy

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  • Marjit, Sugata
  • Mukherjee, Vivekananda
  • Mukherjee, Arijit

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 75-94

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:75-94

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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References

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  1. Sugata Marjit & Arijit Mukherjee, 1996. "A Simple Theory of Harassment and Corruption," Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany 527, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January.
  4. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
  5. Becker, Gary S, 1993. "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 385-409, June.
  6. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
  7. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1990. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," NBER Working Papers 3429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Marcouiller, Douglas & Young, Leslie, 1995. "The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 630-46, June.
  9. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January.
  10. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
  11. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1992. "Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 556-65, June.
  12. Marjit, Sugata & Rajeev, Meenakshi & Mukherjee, Diganta, 2000. "Incomplete information as a deterrent to crime," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 763-773, November.
  13. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
  14. Lui, Francis T., 1986. "A dynamic model of corruption deterrence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 215-236, November.
  15. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  16. Cadot, Olivier, 1987. "Corruption as a gamble," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July.
  17. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
  18. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.
  19. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-66, October.
  20. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
  21. Cowell, F A, 1990. "Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 231-43, January.
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