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• Douglas Marcouiller

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 630-46
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:3:p:630-46

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4. Douglas Marcouiller, S.J. & Veronica Ruiz de Castilla & Christopher Woodruff, 1995. "Formal Measures of the Informal Sector Wage Gap in Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 294., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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