Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Studies, University of Dundee in its series Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics with number 112.
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Mishra, Ajit, 2002. "Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-178, February.
- A Mishra, . "Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In Model Of Enforcement," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 067, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
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