This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Collusive Auditors

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Khalil, Fahad
Lawarree, Jacques
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199505%2985%3A2%3C442%3ACA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 442-46
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:2:p:442-46

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Felgenhauer, Mike & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Safety Nets Within Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 6317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roland Strausz, . "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Papers 018, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ingela Alger, 2006. "Optimal Debt Contracts when Credit Managers are (Perhaps) Corruptible," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 648, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alexandre Gaudeul & Bruno Jullien, 2005. "E-commerce, two-sided markets and info-mediation," Industrial Organization 0503014, EconWPA, revised 05 Apr 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2001. "Are two investors better than one?," CSEF Working Papers 71, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  7. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  8. Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2004. "To Serve The Community Or Oneself: The Public Servant'S Dilemma," Development and Comp Systems 0409035, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Osipian, Ararat, 2008. "The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata," MPRA Paper 7592, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. A. Menichini & P. Simmons, . "Can Liars Ever Prosper," Discussion Papers 02/10, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.