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How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens Progressive Taxes

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  • Roland Hodler
  • Kurt Schmidheiny

Abstract

We study the tension between fiscal decentralization and progressive taxation. We present a multi-community model in which the local income tax rate is determined by an exogenous progressive tax schedule and a tax shifter that can differ across communities. The progressivity of the tax schedule induces a self-sorting process that results in substantial though imperfect income sorting. Rich households are more likely to locate themselves in low tax communities than poor households. The actual tax structure is thus less progressive than the exogenous tax schedule. To investigate the quantitative implications of our model, we calibrate a fully-specified version to the largest metropolitan area in Switzerland. The equilibrium values of the simulation show the same pattern across communities as we observe in this area. The theoretical result is challenged by estimating the actual tax structure faced by the households in this area. We find that the actual tax structure is indeed substantially less progressive than the fixed tax schedule.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Tufts University in its series Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University with number 0508.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0508

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Keywords: Progressive Taxation; Fiscal Decentralization; Income Segregation;

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References

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  1. Schmidheiny, Kurt, 2006. "Income segregation and local progressive taxation: Empirical evidence from Switzerland," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 429-458, February.
  2. Ellickson, Bryan, 1971. "Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 334-39, May.
  3. Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas, 1991. "Mobility and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 828-58, August.
  4. Epple, Dennis & Platt, Glenn J., 1998. "Equilibrium and Local Redistribution in an Urban Economy when Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 23-51, January.
  5. Dennis Epple & Holger Sieg, 1999. "Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 645-681, August.
  6. Young, H Peyton, 1990. "Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 253-66, March.
  7. Martin Feldstein & Marian Vaillant, 1994. "Can State Taxes Redistribute Income?," NBER Working Papers 4785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Kurt Schmidheiny, 2005. "Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation When Households Differ in Both Preferences and Incomes," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0509, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  9. Anna Hardman & Yannis Ioannides, 2004. "Neighbors’ Income Distribution: Economic Segregation and Mixing in US Urban Neighborhoods," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0421, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  10. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
  11. Hansen, Julia L. & Formby, John P. & Smith, W. James, 1998. "Estimating the Income Elasticity of Demand for Housing: A Comparison of Traditional and Lorenz-Concentration Curve Methodologies," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 328-342, December.
  12. Mayo, Stephen K., 1981. "Theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 95-116, July.
  13. Westhoff, Frank, 1977. "Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 84-112, February.
  14. Hansen, Julia L. & Formby, John P. & Smith, W. James, 1996. "The Income Elasticity of Demand for Housing: Evidence from Concentration Curves," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 173-192, March.
  15. Ross, Stephen & Yinger, John, 1999. "Sorting and voting: A review of the literature on urban public finance," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: P. C. Cheshire & E. S. Mills (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 47, pages 2001-2060 Elsevier.
  16. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1989. "A re-examination of the use of ability to pay taxes by local governments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 319-342, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gilbert E. Metcalf & Jongsang Park, 2005. "A Comment on the Role of Prices for Excludable Public Goods," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0524, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  2. Darlene C. Chisholm & George Norman, 2006. "When to Exit a Product: Evidence from the U. S. Motion-Picture Exhibition Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 57-61, May.
  3. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Frank Somogyi & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2009. "Tax Competition and Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-25, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  4. Kurt Schmidheiny, 2003. "Income Segregation and Local Progressive Taxation: Empirical Evidence from Switzerland," Diskussionsschriften dp0311, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  5. Darlene C. Chisholm & Margaret S. McMillan & George Norman, 2006. "Product Differentiation and Film Programming Choice: Do First-Run Movie Theatres Show the Same Films?," NBER Working Papers 12646, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Yannis M. Ioannides, 2005. "Social Networks in Labor Markets," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0517, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  7. Ioannides, Yannis M. & Soetevent, Adriaan R., 2007. "Social networking and individual outcomes beyond the mean field case," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(3-4), pages 369-390.
  8. Sergii Slukhai, 2009. "Inter-Location Small Business Tax Rate Variation in Ukraine: What Is Behind It?," Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 33(1), pages 49-71.

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