This paper studies pension design from a risk management point of view using a lexicographic loss aversion model. Interest in this model stems from the fact that it explains income expansion paths of equity and total savings particularly well. I find that all income groups are likely to benefit from a PAYGO system, even in the absence of any redistribution. Optimal equity investments are close to zero for the two bottom income quintiles and increase sharply for higher incomes. The results are compared to optimal pension plans under HARA preferences. I find that a PAYGO system has higher value under loss aversion than in the HARA case. Moreover, equity shares correspond more closely to empirical observations.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 1572.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2001.
"Social Security,"
NBER Working Papers
8451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B., 2002.
"Social security,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Karen E. Dynan & Jonathan Skinner & Stephen P. Zeldes, 2004.
"Do the Rich Save More?,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 397-444, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Karen E. Dynan & Jonathan Skinner & Stephen P. Zeldes, 2000.
"Do the Rich Save More?,"
NBER Working Papers
7906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco & Francisco J. Gomes & Pascal J. Maenhout, 2001.
"Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, pages 439-482
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: