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Ethnic Diversity and Civil War

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Author Info
Tangerås, Thomas P. () (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)
Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter (Department of Economics)

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Abstract

We construct a model in which a number of equally powerful ethnic groups compete for power by engaging in civil war. In non-redistributive equilibrium, ethnically homogeneous and ethnically diverse countries face a lower probability of civil war than countries with a moderate degree of ethnic diversity. The likelihood of conflict is maximized when there are two ethnic groups. When rent-extraction possibilities are not too big and society sufficiently ethnically homogeneous, there also exists a pacific equilibrium path sustained by redistribution from the ruling group to the out-of-power groups.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 589.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 14 Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0589

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Related research
Keywords: Civil War; Ethnic Diversity; Redistribution; Dynamic Game;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities and Races; Non-labor Discrimination
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
N47 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - Africa; Oceania

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
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  9. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. " A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Rabah Amir & Val E. Lambson, 1998. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    Other versions:
  14. Azam, J.P., 2001. "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa," Working Papers Series 2001-3, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
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    Other versions:
  17. Azam, Jean-Paul, 1995. " How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 173-84, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene, 2002. "Battlefields and Marketplaces," Development and Comp Systems 0210001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Benjamin Bridgman, . "Why Are Ethnically Divided Countries Poor?," Departmental Working Papers 2003-11, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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