Ethnic Diversity and Civil War
AbstractWe construct a model in which a number of equally powerful ethnic groups compete for power by engaging in civil war. In non-redistributive equilibrium, ethnically homogeneous and ethnically diverse countries face a lower probability of civil war than countries with a moderate degree of ethnic diversity. The likelihood of conflict is maximized when there are two ethnic groups. When rent-extraction possibilities are not too big and society sufficiently ethnically homogeneous, there also exists a pacific equilibrium path sustained by redistribution from the ruling group to the out-of-power groups.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 589.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 14 Oct 2002
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Civil War; Ethnic Diversity; Redistribution; Dynamic Game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
- N47 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Africa; Oceania
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-02-10 (All new papers)
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- NEP-MFD-2003-02-10 (Microfinance)
- NEP-PKE-2003-02-10 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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