Predation, Efficiency, and Inequality
AbstractThis paper analyzes a general-equilibrium model in which each person can choose to be either a producer or a predator. This model shows how predation breaks the link between the interpersonal distribution of productive resources and the inter-personal distribution of consumption. Specifically, we find that in this model the Rawlsian criterion of maximizing the expected consumption of the least advantaged person selects an unegalitarian distribution of productive resources in which a positive fraction of people have only the minimum possible endowment of productive resources. Also, an egalitarian distribution of productive resources is not even Pareto efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 158 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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