Predation, Efficiency, and Inequality
AbstractThis paper analyzes a general-equilibrium model in which each person can choose to be either a producer or a predator. This model shows how predation breaks the link between the interpersonal distribution of productive resources and the inter-personal distribution of consumption. Specifically, we find that in this model the Rawlsian criterion of maximizing the expected consumption of the least advantaged person selects an unegalitarian distribution of productive resources in which a positive fraction of people have only the minimum possible endowment of productive resources. Also, an egalitarian distribution of productive resources is not even Pareto efficient.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 158 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Herschel I. Grossman & M. Kim, 1997.
"Human Capital and Predation: A Positive Theory of Educational Policy,"
97-30, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 1998. "Human Capital and Predation: A Positive Theory of Educational Policy," NBER Working Papers 6403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 1997.
""Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State,"
NBER Working Papers
6289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March.
- P Madden & Z Gu, 2006. "Inequality in the Relative Differential Senseand Predation in a Primitive Economy," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0601, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Dieter Bös & Martin Kolmar, 2000.
"Anarchy, Efficiency and Redistribution,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse10_2000, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Shankha Chakraborty & Era Dabla-Norris, 2005.
IMF Working Papers
05/43, International Monetary Fund.
- Grossman, Herschel I., 2005.
"Inventors and pirates: creative activity and intellectual property rights,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 269-285, June.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 2000. "Inventors and Pirates: Creative Activity and Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 7898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Herschel Grossman, 2000. "Inventors and Pirates:Creative Activity and Intellectual Property Rights," Working Papers 2000-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 2003.
"Educational Policy: Egalitarian or Elitist?,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 225-246, November.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 1998.
"Producers and Predators,"
98-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Kolmar, Martin, 2005. "The contribution of Herschel I. Grossman to political economy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 802-814, December.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Corporate Rent-Seeking and the managerial soft-budget constraint," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 283, Universidad del CEMA.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.