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Dynamic Winner-take-all Conflict

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Author Info
John W. Maxwell (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business)
Rafael Reuveny (School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University)
Jefferson Davis (Stat-Math, Indiana University)

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Abstract

This paper develops a model of dynamic conflict featuring probabilistic winner- take-all outcomes and compares its behavior to a model in which combatants emerge with a share of the conflict spoils. While these two models generate the same behavior in a one-shot game, we find that in a repeated conflict setting the winner-take-all model generates richer dynamics than the dynamics generated by the share model. Differences include outcomes that illustrate the rise and fall of great powers, the endogenous extinction of combatants, and frequent changes in the relative dominance of combatants. The model's behavior is compared to real world military, business and political conflict outcomes.

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File URL: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bepp2007-12-maxwell-reuveny-davis.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy in its series Working Papers with number 2007-12.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2007-12

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Related research
Keywords: Anarchy; Fog of War; Paradox of Power; Winner-take-all conflict;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brander, J.A. & Taylor, M.S., 1996. "The Simple Economics of Easter Island: A Ricardo-Malthus Model of Renewable Resource Use," UBC Departmental Archives 96-08, UBC Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  2. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
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  6. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 166-79, January.
  7. Rafael Reuveny & John W. Maxwell, . "Conflict and Renewable Resources," Working Papers 2004-26, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  8. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
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  9. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 480-94, July.
  10. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Maxwell, John W. & Reuveny, Rafael, 2005. "Continuing conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 30-52, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • John W. Maxwell & Rafael Reuveny, 2004. "Continuing Conflict," Working Papers 2004-27, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  12. Dan Usher, 1986. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," Working Papers 671, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
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