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From rags to rifles: deprivation, conflict and the welfare state

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  • Dominic Rohner

Abstract

Historical evidence suggests that poor population groups are more likely to engage in conflict. We construct a theoretical model of the choice between appropriation and production. Fully specified production functions allow for both symmetrical outcomes and for introducing inequalities in abilities and endowments. It is examined under what conditions income and capital redistribution, as well as education, health and poverty-alleviation spending reduce the incentives for appropriation. Empirical evidence is presented that is consistent with the theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 463.

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Date of creation: Jan 2010
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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:463

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Keywords: Conflict; deprivation; welfare state; poverty; appropriative activities.;

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  1. Jean-Paul Azam, 2001. "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 38(4), pages 429-444, July.
  2. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October.
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  4. Patricia Justino, 2004. "Redistribution, Inequality And Political Conflict," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004, Royal Economic Society 143, Royal Economic Society.
  5. Rohner, Dominic, 2006. "Beach holiday in Bali or East Timor? Why conflict can lead to under- and overexploitation of natural resources," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 113-117, July.
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  7. Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
  8. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  9. Paul Collier & Dominic Rohner, 2008. "Democracy, Development, and Conflict," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 531-540, 04-05.
  10. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler & Dominic Rohner, 2009. "Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(1), pages 1-27, January.
  11. Matthew A. Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 117-133, Summer.
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  18. Bruno S. Frey & Dominic Rohner, 2006. "Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media," CREMA Working Paper Series, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) 2006-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
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  21. repec:fth:oxesaf:2001-3 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Do, Quy-Toan & Iyer, Lakshmi, 2007. "Poverty, social divisions, and conflict in Nepal," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4228, The World Bank.
  23. Suk Jae Noh, 2002. "Production, Appropriation, and Income Transfer," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(2), pages 279-287, April.
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