The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead
AbstractThis paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, including privatization, are briefly discussed. Its empirical successes, public policy applications, and other accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfinished business.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.
Volume (Year): 38 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Combining Transaction Cost Economics and the Property Rights Approach
by Peter Klein in Organizations and Markets on 2008-01-12 04:10:13
- Four Theories of the Firm
by Peter Klein in Organizations and Markets on 2006-12-07 16:55:27
RePEc Biblio mentionsAs found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
- > Schools of Economic Thought, Epistemology of Economics > Heterodox Approaches > Institutional Economics
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