Vietnam's firms contract without the shadow of the law and only partly in the shadow of the future. Although contracting rests in part on the threat of loss of future business, firms often are willing to renegotiate following a breach, so the retaliation is not as forceful as in the standard repeated-game story and not as effective a sanction. To ensure agreements are kept, firms rely on other devices to supplement repeated-game incentives. Firms scrutinize their trading partners. Community sanctions are occasionally invoked. Transactions with greater risk of reneging are supported by more elaborate governance structures. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 15 (1999) Issue (Month): 3 (October) Pages: 637-58 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:637-58
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