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An Experimental Test of a Predator-Prey Model of Conflict


Author Info

  • Charles Anderton

    (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

  • John Carter

    (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)


Grossman and Kim's (1996) predator-prey model predicts as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium level of appropriation will vary from zero to full to partial predation. We test the prediction using a repeated single-play protocol with eight decision periods. The data show a clear and substantial convergence to subgame perfect outcomes, with most movement occurring in the first several periods. The results suggest that standard game-theoretic principles may be particularly appropriate to the study of conflict.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 9603.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 45:1, May 2001, pp. 83-97.
Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:9603

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Related research

Keywords: appropriation; property rights; Predator-Prey game; conflict;

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