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Determinants of Revolt: Evidence from Survey and Laboratory Data

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  • KLAUS ABBINK

    ()
    (University of Nottingham)

  • SILVIA PEZZINI

    ()
    (London School of Economics, University of Namur)

Abstract

This paper examines determinants of revolutionary behaviour. We study the role of freedom of communication, repression of opposition and the government’s selfishness. Combining econometric analysis of survey data with a laboratory experiment, we analyse how these factors affect preferences for revolt and revolutionary action. We introduce an experimental game capturing essential features of a dictatorship. The results show that the feeling that the government operates selfishly increases both revolutionary preferences and actions. Political repression and lack of communication freedom increase revolutionary attitudes but decrease actual opposition, consistent with the collective action problem faced by opposition to a dictatorship.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2005-01.

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Date of creation: Feb 2005
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Handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2005-01

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Postal: School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD
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Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/
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Keywords: Conflict; revolutions; experimental economics; surveys;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2007. "Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 689.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Daniel Mirza, 2012. "Inequality and Inter-group Conflicts – Experimental Evidence," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-07-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
  3. Klaus Abbink & Matthew Ellman, 2005. "The Donor Problem," Working Papers 151, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

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