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A Contractarian Theory of Property Rights and Crime

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  • Skogh, Goran
  • Stuart, Charles

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 84 (1982)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 27-40

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:84:y:1982:i:1:p:27-40

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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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Cited by:
  1. Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March.
  2. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "A Critical Review of Strategic Conflict Theory and Socio-political Instability Models," Revue d'├ęconomie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(6), pages 817-858.
  3. Louis Hotte & Randy McFerrin & Douglas Wills, 2011. "On the Dual Nature of Weak Property Rights," Working Papers 1103E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  4. Jack Hirshleifer, 1992. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," UCLA Economics Working Papers 674, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Jack Hirshleifer, 1990. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," UCLA Economics Working Papers 597, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Rider, Robert, 1999. "Conflict, the sire of exchange: "Violence is the sire of all the world's values." Robinson Jeffers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 217-232, November.
  7. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley & Yuji Tamura, 2010. "A New Approach to Solving Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 3060, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Carter, John R. & Anderton, Charles H., 2001. "An experimental test of a predator-prey model of appropriation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 83-97, May.
  9. Jack Hirshleifer, 1995. "Experimental Tests of the Paradox of Power," UCLA Economics Working Papers 741, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Jack Hirshleifer, 1995. "Theorizing About Conflict," UCLA Economics Working Papers 727, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Sylwester, Kevin, 2001. "A model of institutional formation within a rent seeking environment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 169-176, February.
  12. Teng, Jimmy, 2000. "Endogenous authoritarian property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 81-95, July.
  13. Noh Suk Jae, 1999. "Two And One Sided Conflict: Effectiveness and Scale in a Ratio Form of Conflict Technology," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 101-118.

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