Common Pool Games Are Convex Games
AbstractFor the class of cooperative common pool games the paper focuses on the question of how, during the preplay negotiation process, the ability of coalitions to enforce their claims imposes externalities on the opposition by having an impact on the jointly produced resource. One of our main results is that common pool games are clear games. Based on this result we are able to derive sufficient conditions for the convexity of the characteristic function, which establishes the second main result in the paper, namely that cooperative common pool games are characterized by increasing returns with respect to the coalition size. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 1 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Norde, H.W. & Pham Do, K.H. & Tijs, S.H., 2002.
"Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-89249, Tilburg University.
- Norde, Henk & Pham Do, Kim Hang & Tijs, Stef, 2002. "Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 187-207, March.
- Norde, H.W. & Pham Do, K.H. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Oligopoly Games With and Without Transferable Technologies," Discussion Paper 2000-66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Santiago S?chez-Pag?, . "Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 547.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Trine Tornøe Platz & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2013.
"Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 208-228, 04.
- Trine Tornøe Platz & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2009. "Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations," Discussion Papers 10-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Sep 2010.
- Driessen, Theo S.H. & Meinhardt, Holger I., 2005. "Convexity of oligopoly games without transferable technologies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 102-126, July.
- Axel Ostmann & Holger Meinhardt, 2007. "Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 63-96, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.