Natural resource extraction and civil conflict
AbstractBased on evidence linking natural resources to civil conflict, this paper studies two armed groups fighting to control a resource and possibly a second prize. Labor is used in the agricultural, resource extraction and conflict sectors, and the groups also buy a capital input to conflict subject to the constraint that capital spending cannot exceed resource earnings. I find that exogenous shocks can have different effects on conflict intensity depending on whether the credit constraint binds. In particular, international policies to ban natural resource exports from conflict zones (e.g. ‘blood diamonds’), raise agricultural productivity or limit the import of weapons will limit conflict intensity if the credit constraint binds. However, if the credit constraint does not bind, then the first two policies promote conflict, and so could even the third policy. The results therefore suggest some caution in international policymaking.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 97 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec
Resource curse; Resource extraction; Conflict; Sanctions; Kimberley Process;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
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- Moshik Lavie & Christophe Muller, 2011.
"Incentives and Survival in Violent Conflicts,"
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47, MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict.
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