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Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms

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Author Info
Boerner, Kira

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Abstract

In many countries, governments involve interest groups at early stages of political decisionmaking. The idea of this is to enhance the legitimacy of the policy decision and to curb later opposition to the implementation of the policy. We show that the way and timing of interest groups involvement can be crucial for the scope and success of policy reforms. When interest groups influence both the policy choice, or legislation, and the subsequent decision on the implementation of the policy, their early involvement may lead them to oppose the reform more than if they had been excluded from the legislation stage.

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File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/730/1/Boerner_WP200525.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 730.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:730

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Related research
Keywords: policy choice ; policy implementation ; common agency ; lobbying;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health

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