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Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector

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  • Dino Falaschetti
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    Abstract

    Voter turnout is frequently cited as gauging a polity's health. The ease with which electoral members produce political support can, however, retard an economy's productive capacity. For example, while mobile electorates might efficaciously monitor political agents, they may also lack credibility when committing to regulatory policies. Consequently, a "healthy" polity's economy can rest at an inferior discretionary equilibrium. I develop evidence that the US telecommunications sector may indeed have realized such an outcome. This evidence is remarkably difficult to dismiss as an artifact of endogeneity bias.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0401006.

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    Date of creation: 29 Jan 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0401006

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    Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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    Keywords: Electoral Institutions; Voter Turnout; Distributive Policy; Regulatory Commitment; Telecommunications Policy;

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