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Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods

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Author Info
Anne O. Krueger
Abstract

This paper reexamines current understanding of the political economy of protection. To date, work has centered on determinants of the height of protection and its form - tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and voluntary export restraints. It is argued that examining the structure of protection misses one important piece of evidence - why import-competing industries tend to be more highly protected than industries producing exportables. When the question is cast in this light, a number of new insights emerge, including the importance of earlier protective measures in influencing current protectionist pressures. "Identity bias", whereby political decisions can be asymmetric between winners and losers, depending on whose identity is known, is introduced.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2904.

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Date of creation: Apr 1990
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2904

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  1. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bela Balassa, 1965. "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 573. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Baldwin, Robert E, 1969. "The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(3), pages 295-305, May/June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0791, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Patricio Meller, 2009. "From unilateral liberalization to regional free trade agreements: a Latin America perspective," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 85-103, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Peter Nedergaard, 2009. "European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 17-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Peter Nedergaard, 2006. "Market Failures and Government Failures: A Theoretical Model of the Common Agricultural Policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 385-405, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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