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Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods

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  • Anne O. Krueger
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    Abstract

    This paper reexamines current understanding of the political economy of protection. To date, work has centered on determinants of the height of protection and its form - tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and voluntary export restraints. It is argued that examining the structure of protection misses one important piece of evidence - why import-competing industries tend to be more highly protected than industries producing exportables. When the question is cast in this light, a number of new insights emerge, including the importance of earlier protective measures in influencing current protectionist pressures. "Identity bias", whereby political decisions can be asymmetric between winners and losers, depending on whose identity is known, is introduced.

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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2904.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2904.

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    Date of creation: Apr 1990
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    Publication status: published as The Political Economy of International Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Baldwin. edited by Ronald W. Jones and Anne O. Krueger, pp. 161-178. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2904

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    1. Baldwin, Robert E, 1969. "The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(3), pages 295-305, May/June.
    2. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
    3. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
    4. Bela Balassa, 1965. "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 573.
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    Cited by:
    1. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April.
    2. Amelia U. Santos-Paulino, 2000. "Trade Liberalisation and Export Performance in Selected Developing Countries," Studies in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Kent 0012, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
    3. Patricio Meller, 2009. "From unilateral liberalization to regional free trade agreements: a Latin America perspective," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 85-103, May.
    4. Richard E. Baldwin & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, 2002. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," NBER Working Papers 8756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Peter Nedergaard, 2006. "Market Failures and Government Failures: A Theoretical Model of the Common Agricultural Policy," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 385-405, June.
    6. Raquel Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, 1990. "Why is Trade Reform so Unpopular? On Status Quo Bias in Policy Reforms," NBER Working Papers 3269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Olper, Alessandro & Raimondi, Valentina, 2013. "Electoral rules, forms of government and redistributive policy: Evidence from agriculture and food policies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-158.
    8. L. Alan Winters, 2000. "Trade Liberalisation and Poverty," PRUS Working Papers, Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, University of Sussex 07, Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, University of Sussex.
    9. Florian Mayneris & Thierry Mayer & Philippe Martin, 2008. "Public support to clusters : a firm level study of French "local productive systems"," Sciences Po publications 7102, Sciences Po.
    10. Vanberg, Viktor, 1990. "A Constitutional Political Economy Perspective on International Trade," 1990: The Environment, Government Policies, and International Trade Meeting, December 1990, San Diego, CA, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium 50875, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    11. Winters, L. Alan, 2000. "Trade, Trade Policy and Poverty: What Are The Links?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2382, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Peter Nedergaard, 2009. "European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 17-47, March.

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