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Protection for Sale Made Easy

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  • Richard E. Baldwin
  • Frédéric Robert-Nicoud

Abstract

Formal analysis of the political economy of trade policy was substantially redirected by the appearance of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman's 1994 paper, "Protection for Sale". Before that article a fairly wide range of approaches were favoured by various authors on various issues, but afterwards, the vast majority of theoretical tracts on endogenous trade policy have used the Protection for Sale framework (PFS for short) as their main vehicle. The reason, of course, is that the framework is both respectable - because its microfoundations are distinctly firmer than were those of the earlier lobbying approaches - and it is very easy to work with. Despite the popularity of the PFS framework, it appears that no one has presented a simple diagram that illustrates how the PFS frameworks and explains why it is so easy. This short note aims to remedy that ommission.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0800.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0800

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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP

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Keywords: protection for sale; endogenous protection;

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  1. Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen & Stephen J. Redding & Peter K. Schott, 2007. "Firms in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 13054, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Cuñat, Alejandro & Melitz, Marc J, 2007. "Volatility, Labour Market Flexibility, and the Pattern of Comparative Advantage," CEPR Discussion Papers 6297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Buiter, Willem H., 2007. "Seigniorage," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 1(10), pages 1-49.
  4. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel, 2004. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Economic History Working Papers 20283, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
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Cited by:
  1. Richard E. Baldwin, 2006. "Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(11), pages 1451-1518, November.
  2. Baldwin, Richard, 2010. "Unilateral tariff liberalisation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8162, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, 09.

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