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• Richard Baldwin

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 24 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 287-290
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:24:y:1987:i:3:p:287-290

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