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Single-basined choice

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  • Bossert W.
  • Peters H.J.M.

    (GSBE)

Abstract

Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent.

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File URL: http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/7e06f15f-8d5b-4a36-a182-25376f77a308
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) in its series Research Memorandum with number 030.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013030

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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
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Keywords: Consumer Economics: Theory; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations;

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  3. Denis Lescop, 2007. "Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 273-284, March.
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  6. Öztürk, Murat & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2013. "Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 14-16.
  7. Berga, Dolors, 1998. "Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 105-120, March.
  8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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  12. Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2007. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 325, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  13. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2006. "Single-peaked choice," Research Memorandum 037, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  14. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 105-115.
  15. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Single-dipped preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 801.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  16. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
  17. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2010. "Consistency, Choice, and Rationality," Economics Books, Harvard University Press, Harvard University Press, number 9780674052994.
  18. Öztürk Murat & Peters Hans & Storcken Ton, 2012. "On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  19. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  20. Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 339-346, September.
  21. Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2008. "Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 533-547, November.
  22. Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 392-416, October.
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