Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms

Contents:

Author Info

  • David Pérez-Castrillo
  • Nicolas Quérou

Abstract

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Prez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is smoother in the sense that small variations in an agents bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. Unlike in the study by Prez Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://research.barcelonagse.eu/tmp/working_papers/520.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 520.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:520

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona
Phone: +34 93 542-1222
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Email:
Web page: http://www.barcelonagse.eu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Mechanism design; NIMBY;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Glazer, Jacob & Ma, Ching-To Albert, 1989. "Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 222-233, September.
  2. Rob, R., 1988. "Pollution Claim Settlements Under Private Information," Papers 19-88, Tel Aviv.
  3. Minehart, Deborah & Neeman, Zvika, 2002. "Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 303-324, March.
  4. O'Sullivan Arthur, 1993. "Voluntary Auctions for Noxious Facilities: Incentives to Participate and the Efficiency of Siting Decisions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages S12-S26, July.
  5. Varian, H,R., 1991. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed," Papers 10, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  6. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Ingberman Daniel E., 1995. "Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages S20-S33, November.
  8. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2006. "Efficient bidding with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 304-320, November.
  9. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September.
  10. Slikker, Marco, 2007. "Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 493-511, November.
  11. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
  12. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
  13. Kamijo, Yoshio, 2008. "Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 336-349, November.
  14. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 201(3), pages 811-820, March.
  15. Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2011. "Choosing and sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 296-300, September.
  16. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  17. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  18. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1986. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 295-99, May.
  19. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
  20. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
  21. EHLERS, Lars, 2005. "Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism," Cahiers de recherche 2005-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  22. Perez-Castrillo, David & Veszteg, Robert F., 2007. "Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 394-411, July.
  23. David Perez-Castrillo & Robert F. Veszteg, 2005. "Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 638.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  24. Moulin, H, 1984. "The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 157-70, January.
  25. Róbert Veszteg, 2010. "Multibidding game under uncertainty," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 311-329, September.
  26. Perez-Castrillo, D. & Wettstein, D., 1999. "Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation," Papers 24-99, Tel Aviv.
  27. Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1995. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Papers 9581, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  28. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  29. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
  30. Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:520. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.