Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Smooth multibidding mechanisms

Contents:

Author Info

  • David Pérez-Castrillo

    ()

  • Nicolas Quérou

    ()

Abstract

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is "smoother" in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. Unlike in the study by Pérez Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to effciency as is desired.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2010/84910.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 849.10.

as in new window
Length: 35
Date of creation: 05 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:849.10

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Email:
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: mechanism design; NIMBY;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ingberman Daniel E., 1995. "Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages S20-S33, November.
  2. Slikker, Marco, 2007. "Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 493-511, November.
  3. Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Justin Leroux, 2007. "Choosing and Sharing," Cahiers de recherche 07-13, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  4. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January.
  5. Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
  6. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
  7. Róbert Veszteg, 2010. "Multibidding game under uncertainty," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 311-329, September.
  8. Rob, R., 1988. "Pollution Claim Settlements Under Private Information," Papers 19-88, Tel Aviv.
  9. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  10. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
  11. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September.
  12. Perez-Castrillo, David & Veszteg, Robert F., 2007. "Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 394-411, July.
  13. Lars Ehlers, 2009. "Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 505-512, June.
  14. Inés Macho & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2005. "Efficient Bidding with Externalitites," Working Papers 159, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  15. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 201(3), pages 811-820, March.
  16. Ju, Y. & Wettstein, D., 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach," Discussion Paper 2006-42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  17. Perez-Castrillo, D. & Wettstein, D., 1999. "Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation," Papers 24-99, Tel Aviv.
  18. Hal R. Varian, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed}," Microeconomics 9401003, EconWPA.
  19. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
  20. David Perez-Castrillo & Robert F. Veszteg, 2005. "Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 638.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  21. Minehart, Deborah & Neeman, Zvika, 2002. "Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 303-324, March.
  22. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
  23. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
  24. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
  25. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1986. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 295-99, May.
  26. Kamijo, Yoshio, 2008. "Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 336-349, November.
  27. O'Sullivan Arthur, 1993. "Voluntary Auctions for Noxious Facilities: Incentives to Participate and the Efficiency of Siting Decisions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages S12-S26, July.
  28. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  29. Glazer, Jacob & Ma, Ching-To Albert, 1989. "Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 222-233, September.
  30. Moulin, H, 1984. "The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 157-70, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:849.10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xavier Vila).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.