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Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations

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Makowski Louis
Mezzetti Claudio

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 64 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 500-519
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:64:y:1994:i:2:p:500-519

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