Centralized vs. Decentralized Redistribution: A Case for Interregional Transfer Mechanisms
AbstractAccording to conventional wisdom, Musgrave's “RedistributionBranch” should be assigned to the central level of governmentin a federation. Otherwise, fiscal externalities created by themobility of the poor would render decentralized redistributioninefficient, if not impossible. The paper objects to this viewand argues that decentralized intraregional redistribution canyield efficient outcomes if it is combined with cleverly designedinterregional transfer mechanisms. Within a general frameworkwe give necessary and sufficient conditions for interregionaltransfer schemes to implement efficient allocations as Nash equilibriaof a decentralized redistribution game. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.
Volume (Year): 4 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
Decentralization; Redistribution; Fiscal Federalism; Public Funds Sharing;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Myers, Gordon M., 1990.
"Optimality, free mobility, and the regional authority in a federation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 107-121, October.
- Myers & G.M., 1989. "Optimality, Free Mobility And The Regional Authority In Federation," Working Papers 10, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
- John B. Burbidge & Gordon M. Myers, 1994. "Redistribution within and across the Regions of a Federation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 620-36, August.
- Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
- Wildasin, D.E., 1992.
"Income Restribution and Migration,"
92-003, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- CREMER, Helmuth & FOURGEAUD, Virginie & LEITE-MONTEIRO, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice, .
"Mobility and redistribution: A survey,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1371, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-33, November.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990.
"Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 489-504, May.
- Charles Brown & Wallace E. Oates, 1987.
"Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System,"
NBER Working Papers
1715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-74, September.
- Buhl, Hans Ulrich & Pfingsten, Andreas, 1990. "On the distribution of public funds," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 363-376, December.
- Bureau, Dominique & Champsaur, Paul, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and European Economic Unification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 88-92, May.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Brecher, Richard A & Hatta, Tatsuo, 1983. "The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare: Bilateral Transfers in a Multilateral World," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 606-18, September.
- Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson & Maria Auersperg, 1981. "A New Procedure for the Measurement of Inequality within and among Population Subgroups," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(4), pages 665-85, November.
- Charles Figuieres & Jean Hindriks, 2001.
"Matching Grants and Ricardian Equivalence,"
440, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- FIGUIÈRES, Charles & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2001. "Matching grants and Ricardian equivalence," CORE Discussion Papers 2001048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- FIGUIÈRES , Charles & HINDRIKS, Jean, . "Matching grants and Ricardian equivalence," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1559, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- DREZE, Jacques H. & FIGUIERES, Charles & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2006.
"Voluntary matching grants can forestall social dumping,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2006111, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jacques H. Drèze & Charles Figuières & Jean Hindriks, 2006. "Voluntary Matching Grants Can Forestall Social Dumping," CESifo Working Paper Series 1867, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jacques H. DREZE & Charles FIGUIERES & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2006. "Vountary matching grants can forestall social dumping," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2006063, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Jacques Drèze & Charles Figuières & Jean Hindriks, 2006. "Voluntary Matching Grants can Forestall Social Dumping," Working Papers 06-13, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2006.
- Traub, Stefan, 2003. "Federalism, Freedom of Movement, and Fiscal Equalization," Economics Working Papers 2003,06, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
- Rizzo Leonzio, 2006. "Le inefficienze della competizione fiscale: una rassegna dei principali modelli teorici," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 89-120.
- Seija Parviainen, 1998. "Redistribution and Risk Sharing in EMU," Discussion Papers 159, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- Feld, Lars P, 2000. " Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 125-64, October.
- Horst Raff & John Wilson, 1997. "Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 407-427, November.
- Wagener, Andreas, 2000. "Variable population size issues in models of decentralized income redistribution," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 609-625, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.