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Topping Up or Opting Out? The Optimal Design of Public Provision Schemes

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Author Info
Blomquist, Soren
Christiansen, Vidar
Abstract

There is extensive public provision of private goods in all developed countries. The public provision scheme is often designed so that individuals can opt out but not top up (supplement) the publicly provided quantity/quality. Using an optimal income tax/public provision model, the authors derive the respective conditions under which a public provision scheme should allow or forbid supplementing. Disregarding administrative costs, a system where individuals are not allowed to top up is optimal if the demand for the publicly provided good increases in the amount of leisure available, while a scheme allowing individuals to top up is warranted if the demand decreases with the amount of leisure. Copyright 1998 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 39 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 399-411
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:39:y:1998:i:2:p:399-411

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  1. Ana María Iregui, 2002. "Decentralised Provision Of Quasi-Private Goods: The Case Of Colombia," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 002251, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Simona GRASSI, 2006. "On the characteristics of a mixed system of provision of a private good. An application to health care," Departemental Working Papers 2006-14, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy.
  3. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Welfare Enhancing Marginal Tax Rates: The Case of Publicly Provided Day Care," Arbetsrapport 2004:6, Institute for Futures Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 12, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay & Joan Esteban, 2007. "Redistributive Taxation and PublicExpenditures," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 95, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2006. "Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance," IFS Working Papers W06/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  7. Luciano Greco, 2006. "Optimal Redistribution With Productive Social Services," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0026, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
  8. Jukka Pirttilä & Sanna Tenhunen, 2008. "Pawns and queens revisited: public provision of private goods when individuals make mistakes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(5), pages 599-619, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 1998. "The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods," Working Paper Series 1998:14, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Leonardo Gasparini & Santiago Pinto, 2005. "Equality of Opportunity and Optimal Cash and In-Kind Policies," Working Papers 0022, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Thomas Gaube, 2000. "Efficient Public Good Provision with Nonlinear Income Taxation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0850, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  12. Soeren Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2003. "Is there a Case for Public Provision of Private Goods if Preferences are Heterogeneous? An Example with Day Care," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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