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Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds

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Author Info
Dan Usher

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Abstract

Tax evasion is analogous to deadweight loss in its effect upon the rules for cost-benefit analysis of public sector projects. Deadweight loss and tax evasion both cause the marginal cost of public funds to increase as tax payers attempt to reduce the tax base in response to increases in tax rates. In one case, the social cost is from the diversion of resources from highly taxed to less taxed activities. In the other, the social cost includes the expense of concealment of income from the tax collector, the cost to the public sector of detecting and punishing tax evasion, and the cost of punishment to the convicted tax evader. It follows that a complete theory of optimal taxation can be derived from the susceptibilities to evasion of the different means of taxation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 637.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1986
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Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:637

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  1. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2000. "The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(6), pages 641-664, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bernard Fortin & Thomas Lemieux & Pierre Frechette, 1990. "An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in the Underground Economy," NBER Working Papers 3392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gideon Yaniv, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 27-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tiff Macklem & David Rose & Robert Tetlow, . "GOVERNMENT DEBT AND DEFICITS IN CANADA: A Macro Simulation Analysis," Working Papers 95-4, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-07, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  6. Louis Kaplow, 1991. "Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion," NBER Working Papers 2996, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Joel Slemrod, 2001. "A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 119-128, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Roger N. Waud, 1989. "Tax Aversion, Optimal Tax Rates, and Indexation," NBER Working Papers 2643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1994. "Analyzing the standard deduction as a presumptive tax," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 25-34, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Claude Montmarquette, 1997. "Are Underground Workers More Likely To Be Underground Consumers?," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-28, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Jan Hanousek & Filip Palda, 2009. "Is there a displacement deadweight loss from tax evasion? Estimates using firm surveys from the Czech Republic," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 139-158, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Robin Boadway, 2006. "Principles of Cost-Benefit Analysis," Microeconomics Working Papers 666, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  13. Stanley Winer & Michael Tofias & Bernard Grofman & John Aldrich, 2008. "Trending economic factors and the structure of Congress in the growth of government, 1930–2002," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 415-448, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Robin Boadway, 1998. "The Mirrlees Approach to the Theory of Economic Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Yitzhaki, Shlomo & Vakneen, Yitzhak, 1988. "The shadow price of a tax inspector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 76, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  16. Ralph C Bayer & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest," Experimental 0412003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Joel Slemrod, 1991. "Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems," NBER Working Papers 3038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Frank Flatters & W. Macleod, 1995. "Administrative corruption and taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 397-417, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Christos Constantatos & Edwin G. West, 1991. "Measuring Returns from Education: Some Neglected Factors," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 17(2), pages 127-138, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Ray, R., 1994. "The Reform and Design of Commodity Taxes in the Presence of Tax Evasion with Illustrative Evidence from India," Discussion Paper 108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  21. Ratbek Dzhumashev & Emin Gahramanov, 2009. "A Stochastic Growth Model with Income Tax Evasion: Implications for Australia," Economics Series 2009_05, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  22. Eide, Erling, 2002. "Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility," Memorandum 03/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  23. José Manuel González-Páramo, . "Midiendo El Coste Marginal En Bienestar De Una Reforma Impositiva," Working Papers 32-02 Classification-JEL , Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. [Downloadable!]
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