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Price Subsidies versus Public Provision

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Author Info

  • Blomquist, Sören

    ()
    (Department of Economics)

  • Christiansen, Vidar

    ()
    (Oslo University)

Abstract

The paper discusses which redistributional policies are efficient when the identity of the high and low skill persons is private information. Our major purpose is to identify the more efficient policy when, presumably for administrative reasons, the policy option is confined to the choice between a price subsidy or public provision in addition to income taxation. We also study the simultaneous use of nonlinear taxation, commodity taxation and public provision of private goods.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 1997:12.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 05 May 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Tax and Public Finance, 1998, pages 283-306.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1997_012

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Email:
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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Related research

Keywords: price subsidy; public provision; private goods; in-kind transfers; optimal taxation;

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Cited by:
  1. Jukka Pirttilä & Sanna Tenhunen, 2008. "Pawns and queens revisited: public provision of private goods when individuals make mistakes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(5), pages 599-619, October.
  2. Luciano Greco, 2006. "Optimal Redistribution With Productive Social Services," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0026, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  3. Pirttilä, Jukka, 1998. "Earmarking of Environmental Taxes: Efficient, After All," Research Discussion Papers 4/1998, Bank of Finland.
  4. Jukka Pirttilä & Ilpo Suoniemi, 2010. "Public Provision, Commodity Demand and Hours of Work: An Empirical Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 3000, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Welfare Enhancing Marginal Tax Rates: The Case of Publicly Provided Day Care," Arbetsrapport 2004:6, Institute for Futures Studies.
  6. Blomquist, S. & Christiansen, V., 1998. "The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods," Papers 1998-14, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  7. Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," POLIS Working Papers 12, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  8. Elena Del Rey, 2001. "Economic Integration and Public Provision of Education," Empirica, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 203-218, June.
  9. Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2003. "Is there a Case for Public Provision of Private Goods if Preferences are Heterogeneous? An Example with Day Care," CESifo Working Paper Series 938, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Alessandro Balestrino, 2000. "Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 463-478, August.
  11. Anne Emblem, 2002. "Redistribution at the Hospital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-378, August.

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