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Health insurance reform in four Latin American countries : theory and practice

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Author Info
Jack, William
Abstract

The author examines public economics rationales for public intervention in health insurance markets, draws on the literature of organizational design to examine alternative intervention strategies, and considers health insurance reforms in four Latin American countries -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia -- in light of the theoretical literature. Equity has been the main reason for large-scale public intervention in the health insurance sector, despite the well-known failures of insurance and health care markets associated with imperfect information. Recent reforms have sought less to make private markets more efficient than to make public provision more efficient, sometimes by altering the focus and function of existing institutions (such as the obras sociales in Argentina) or by encouraging the growth of new ones (such as Chile's ISAPREs). Generally, these four Latin American countries have reformed the ways insurance and care are organized and delivered, have tried to extend formal coverage to previously marginalized groups, and have tried to finance this extension fairly. Colombia instituted an implicit two-tiered voucher scheme financed through a proportional wage tax. Chile's financing mechanism is similar but the distribution of benefits is less progressive, so the net effect is less redistributive. Argentina's remodeled obras system went halfway: the financing base is similar and there is some implicit redistribution from richer to poorer obras, but the quality of insurance increases with income. On the face of it, Brazil's health insurance system is less redistributive than those of the other three countries, as no tax is earmarked for financing health insurance. But taxes paid by higher-income taxpayers are not reduced when they choose private insurance, highlighting the problem of examining the health sector independent of the general tax and transfer system.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2492.

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Date of creation: 30 Nov 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2492

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Keywords: Health Economics&Finance Environmental Economics&Policies Insurance&Risk Mitigation Insurance Law Economic Theory&Research

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1997. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6107, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Gouveia, Miguel, 1997. " Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 221-44, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Hammer, Jeffrey S, 1997. "Economic Analysis for Health Projects," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 47-71, February. [Downloadable!]
  5. Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 2001. "Cost Sharing in Health Service Provision: An Empirical Assessment of Cost Savings," Economics Series Working Papers 9969, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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  6. Sören Blömquist & Vidar Christiansen, 1998. "Price Subsidies Versus Public Provision," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 283-306, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying For Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition And Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Dixit, Avinash, 1997. "Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 378-82, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  13. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-80, Part I, M. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Le Grand, Julian, 1991. "Quasi-markets and Social Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1256-67, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Mariano Bosch & Edwin Goni & William Maloney, 2007. "The Determinants of Rising Informality in Brazil: Evidence from Gross Worker Flows," IZA Discussion Papers 2970, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ronald Eduardo Gómez Suárez, 2007. "Cream-Skimming And Risk Adjustment in Colombian Health Insurance System:: The Public Insurer Case," ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMÍA 004295, DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN. [Downloadable!]
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