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Optimal Redistribution With Productive Social Services

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  • Luciano Greco

    ()
    (University of Padua)

Abstract

We analyze the optimality of alternative mechanisms of public provision of private goods affecting the productive capacity of households (e.g. education, health-care) rather than directly their welfare. Opting out mechanisms - often considered a tool to focus social expenditure - are proven to be welfare improving under the assumption that the provided good is not a substitute of households' exogenous productive capacity (say, inherited wealth). Conversely, when publicly provided goods are substitute of inherited productive capacity, topping up mechanisms prove more efficient.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" in its series "Marco Fanno" Working Papers with number 0026.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0026

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Keywords: In-kind transfers; public provision of private goods; opting out; topping up;

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  18. Blomquist, Soren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1998. "Topping Up or Opting Out? The Optimal Design of Public Provision Schemes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-411, May.
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