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Social insurance and redistribution

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  • BOADWAY, Robin
  • LEITE-MONTEIRO, Manuel
  • MARCHAND, Maurice
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable particularly when there is a negative correlation between laborproductivity and loss probability.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2001041.

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Date of creation: 00 Oct 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001041

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References

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  1. Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., . "Redistributive taxation and social insurance," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1235, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-54, November.
  3. Olivia S. Mitchell, 1998. "Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems," NBER Chapters, in: Privatizing Social Security, pages 403-456 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  5. Arnott,Richard & Atkinson,Anthony B. & Arrow,Kenneth & Drèze,Jacques H. (ed.), 1997. "Public Economics Real Author-Name:Vickrey,William," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597630, April.
  6. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
  7. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. HINDRIKS, Jean & DE DONDER, Philippe, 2001. "The politics of redistributive social insurance," CORE Discussion Papers 2001054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Robin W. Boadway, 1994. "The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economics," Working Papers 910, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  10. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1982. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation," Working Papers 500, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Marshall, John M, 1976. "Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 880-90, December.
  12. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 2000. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 992-1005, October.
  13. Petretto, Alessandro, 1999. "Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 727-745, December.
  14. Blomqvist, Ake & Horn, Henrik, 1984. "Public health insurance and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 353-371, August.
  15. Dreze, Jean & Stern, Nicholas, 1987. "The theory of cost-benefit analysis," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 14, pages 909-989 Elsevier.
  16. Atkinson, Anthony B & Stern, N H, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 119-28, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Stéphanie Maillot-Bugnon, 2005. "Assurance maladie et redistribution : le cas de l'arrêt maladie," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 427-443.
  2. Keuschnigg, Christian & Ribi, Evelyn, 2009. "Outsourcing, unemployment and welfare policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 168-176, June.
  3. Francesca BARIGOZZI, 2006. "Supplementary Insurance with 'ex post' moral hazard: efficiency and redistribution," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 295-325.
  4. Kifmann, Mathias & Roeder, Kerstin, 2011. "Premium subsidies and social insurance: Substitutes or complements?," hche Research Papers 2011/01, Hamburg Center for Health Economics (hche), University of Hamburg.
  5. Boadway, Robin & Leite-Monteiro, Manuel & Marchand, Maurice G. & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 4253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2004. "Assurance privée et protection sociale," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(5), pages 577-586.
  7. Billy Jack, 2003. "Redistributing to the sick: How should health expenditures be integrated into the tax system?," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-16, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  8. BOADWAY, Robin & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Tagging and redistributive taxation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1932, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Anil Duman, 2010. "Risks in the labor market and social insurance preferences: Germany and the USA," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(2), pages 150-164, January.
  10. Susanna Kochskämper, 2012. "Reformdebatten in der Krankenversicherung vor dem Hintergrund des europäischen Binnenmarktes," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 02/2012, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.

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