The Efficiency Case of Universality
AbstractThe paper analyzes the replacement of universal social programs with targeted social benefits. We define "universality" as separability of tax/transfer system in income and other non-monetary attributes, and introduce the concept of "parallel equity" - a requirement that like differences in needs should be treated alike. We develop a model which shows that under specificed assumptions universality is efficient as well as equitable; "clawback" results in an inefficient structure of net marginal tax rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 96-05.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Aug 1996
Date of revision: May 1999
Publication status: Published: – revised version in Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (May 1999), pp. 613–629
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Other versions of this item:
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
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- Stuart Adam, 2005. "Measuring the marginal efficiency cost of redistribution in the UK," IFS Working Papers W05/14, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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