The paper analyzes the replacement of universal social programs with targeted social benefits. We define "universality" as separability of tax/transfer system in income and other non-monetary attributes, and introduce the concept of "parallel equity" - a requirement that like differences in needs should be treated alike. We develop a model which shows that under specificed assumptions universality is efficient as well as equitable; "clawback" results in an inefficient structure of net marginal tax rate.
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Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number
96-05.
Length: 22 pages Date of creation: Aug 1996 Date of revision: Publication status: Published: Canadian Journal of Economics, May 1999. Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:96-05
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
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