Direct versus indirect taxation: the design of the tax structure revisited
AbstractThis paper studies the optimal direct/indirect tax mix in a setting where individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endowments). Tax instruments (income and commodity taxes) are constrained solely by the information structure. It presents general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and proves that contrary to Atkinson and Stiglitz's (1976) result, differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of optimal tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods. The following, more specific, results are also derived. First, when cross substitution effects are small the expressions resemble traditional (many households) Ramsey rules. Second, if differences in endowments are confined to some of the goods, the tax rate on goods in which endowments are zero is positively related to income elasticity. Finally, in a Cobb-Douglas illustration with two goods, where endowments differ only in good 1 (and are interpreted as "wealth"), the tax on good 2 provides an indirect way to tax the unobservable wealth. It is higher (i) the more significant are the wealth differentials, (ii) the stronger is the correlation between wealth and earning ability and (iii) the larger are the (political) weights attached to low wealth individuals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1999010.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2001. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisted," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(3), pages 781-99, August.
- CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU , Pierre & ROCHET, Jean-Charles, . "Direct versus indirect taxation: the design of the tax structure revisited," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1528, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Anthony B. Atkinson, 1976.
"Optimal Taxation and the Direct versus Indirect Tax Controversy,"
247, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- A. B. Atkinson, 1977. "Optimal Taxation and the Direct versus Indirect Tax Controversy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 10(4), pages 590-606, November.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1995. "Uncertainty, Optimal Taxation and the Direct versus Indirect Tax Controversy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(432), pages 1165-79, September.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1987.
"Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics,"
NBER Working Papers
2189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042 Elsevier.
- Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
- Mirrlees, J. A., 1976.
"Optimal tax theory : A synthesis,"
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Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 327-358, November.
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