This paper explores aspects of the optimal design of tax/transfer schemes that involve elements of both 'tagging' (the use of categorical benefits) and 'means-testing' (income relation of benefits). Simulations suggest a striking qualitative dissimilarity between the group-specific schedules optimally imposed on poorer and richer groups: broadly speaking, the optimal marginal tax rate is decreasing in income among the latter but increasing among the former. This latter observation, potentially important for policy, runs counter to the conventional wisdom from previous simulations. The reconciliation, the authors argue, lies in the role played in optimal tax design by the revenue constraint. Coauthors are Ravi Kanbur, Michael Keen, and Matti Tuomala. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 65 (1998) Issue (Month): 258 (May) Pages: 179-92 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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