Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Gender-Based and Couple-Based Taxation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bastani, Spencer

    ()
    (Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies)

Abstract

In a recent paper Alesina et al. (2011) construct a model in which different labor supply elasticities for men and women emerge endogenously from intra-household bargaining. In this paper I explore the optimal tax implications of their model in an economy with both singles and couples and inequality across as well as within households. In the model, the welfare of married women can be improved by lowering taxes for single women. Moreover, if single men earn more than single women, the welfare of married women can alternatively be improved by a gender-neutral tax scheme which taxes singles at a higher rate. Because the government is concerned not only with equalizing utilities within families, but also with the redistribution between high income and low income households, gender-based adjustments in the income tax must be weighed against the welfare consequences of changing the progressivity of the tax system. I find that larger lump-sum transfers to women is always optimal. Interestingly, marginal tax rates, on the other hand, should be lower for women only if the exogenous bargaining power of men is moderate. The welfare gains of gender based taxation are sizable and the welfare gains of having tax instruments which depend on household composition are even larger.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ucfs.nek.uu.se/digitalAssets/129/129526_wp20126.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies with number 2012:6.

as in new window
Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 28 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published as Bastani, Spencer, 'Gender-Based and Couple-Based Taxation' in International Tax and Public Finance , 2013, pages 653-686.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uufswp:2012_006

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Email:
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: optimal taxation; tagging; family economics; intra-household bargaining;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, 2009. "The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 14976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2010. "Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation withHeterogeneity in Needs," CESifo Working Paper Series 3275, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Bastani, Spencer & Blomquist, Sören & Micheletto, Luca, 2010. "The Welfare Gains of Age Related Optimal Income Taxation," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University, Department of Economics 2010:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  4. Ted Bergstrom, 1995. "Economic in a Family Way," Papers, University of Michigan, Department of Economics _028, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
  5. Erwin Ooghe & Andreas Peichl, 2011. "Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 3518, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Matthew Weinzierl, 2011. "The Surprising Power of Age-Dependent Taxes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1490-1518.
  7. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 1-40, May.
  8. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  9. Dan Anderberg, 2008. "Tax credits, income support, and partnership decisions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 499-526, August.
  10. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën ces10.34, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  11. Craig Brett, 2007. "Optimal nonlinear taxes for families," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 225-261, June.
  12. Sheshinski, Eytan, 1972. "The Optimal Linear Income-Tax," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 297-302, July.
  13. Reuben Gronau, 1976. "Leisure, Home Production and Work--The Theory of The Allocation of Time Revisited," NBER Working Papers 0137, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Stern, N. H., 1976. "On the specification of models of optimum income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 123-162.
  15. Lewbel, Arthur & Pendakur, Krishna, 2008. "Estimation of collective household models with Engel curves," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 350-358, December.
  16. Robin BOADWAY & Pierre PESTIEAU, 2006. "Tagging and redistributive taxation," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 123-147.
  17. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Paul Schrimpf, 2010. "Optimal Mandates and the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence From the U.K. Annuity Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 1031-1092, 05.
  18. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  19. Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983. "Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April.
  20. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "Tagging and Income Taxation: Theory and an Application," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 31-50, February.
  21. Apps, P.F. & Rees, R., 1996. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics 301, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  22. repec:oup:restud:v:78:y::i:4:p:1490-1518 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  24. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2009. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 537-560, 03.
  25. Blundell, Richard & Shephard, Andrew, 2011. "Employment, Hours of Work and the Optimal Taxation of Low Income Families," IZA Discussion Papers 5745, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  26. Jeremy Lise & Shannon Seitz, 2011. "Consumption Inequality and Intra-household Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 328-355.
  27. Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2008. "Age-related Optimal Income Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(1), pages 45-71, 03.
  28. Viard, Alan D, 2001. " Optimal Categorical Transfer Payments: The Welfare Economics of Limited Lump-Sum Redistribution," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 483-500.
  29. Saez, Emmanuel, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 205-29, January.
  30. Bergstrom, T., 1995. "Economics of a Family Way," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 95-07, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  31. Jonathan Gruber, 2004. "Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(4), pages 799-834, October.
  32. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  33. Immonen, Ritva, et al, 1998. "Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer Schemes," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(258), pages 179-92, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. How to best tax by gender and marital status
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-04-23 13:51:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kanbur, Ravi & Tuomala, Matti, 2014. "Groupings and the Gains From Tagging," Working Papers, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management 180142, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:uufswp:2012_006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Katarina Grönvall).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.