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Gender-based and couple-based taxation

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  • Spencer Bastani

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the optimal taxation of singles and couples in an economy with bargaining couples. The government is concerned with the redistribution of income from individuals with high utility to individuals with low utility, recognizing that some individuals live in couple households where resources are unevenly distributed. I analyze how redistributive linear income taxes, which depend on either gender or household composition (or both) impact the distribution of utility within and across households. An interesting implication arising from the interaction between the model elements is that even though between-group lump-sum transfers always favor women, when the bargaining power of men is high, women are subject to a higher tax rate; this in contrast to previous analyses of gender-based taxation. My quantitative analysis demonstrates that the welfare effects of gender-based taxation are sizable and even larger when taxes depend on the composition of the household. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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  • Spencer Bastani, 2013. "Gender-based and couple-based taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(4), pages 653-686, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:20:y:2013:i:4:p:653-686
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-013-9285-9
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. How to best tax by gender and marital status
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-04-23 18:51:00

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    Cited by:

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    2. Karina Doorley & Claire Keane, 2024. "Tax-benefit systems and the gender gap in income," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 22(2), pages 285-309, June.
    3. Spencer Bastani & Jacob Lundberg, 2017. "Political preferences for redistribution in Sweden," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 15(4), pages 345-367, December.
    4. Patricia Gallego-Granados & Johannes Geyer, 2015. "Distributional and Behavioral Effects of the Gender Wage Gap," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 753, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    5. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2019. "Nonlinear and piecewise linear income taxation, and the subsidization of work-related goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(4), pages 806-834, August.
    6. Chakraborty, Lekha S, 2021. "Fiscal Federalism, Expenditure Assignments and Gender Equality," MPRA Paper 111949, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Maldonado, Dario & Roeder, Kerstin, 2016. "Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 454-470.
    8. Doorley, Karina & Bercholz, Maxime & Callan, Tim & Keane, Claire & Walsh, John R., 2018. "The gender impact of Irish budgetary policy 2008-2018," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number BKMNEXT367.
    9. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2016. "Public Pensions in a Multi-Period Mirrleesian Income Tax Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 6206, CESifo.
    10. Lindahl, Erica & Rosenqvist, Olof & Selin, Håkan, 2023. "Gender-targeted transfers by default? - Evidence from a child allowance reform in Sweden," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    11. Maria Coelho & Aieshwarya Davis & Alexander Klemm & Carolina Osorio-Buitron, 2024. "Gendered taxes: the interaction of tax policy with gender equality," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(5), pages 1413-1460, October.
    12. Kanbur, Ravi & Tuomala, Matti, 2016. "Groupings and the gains from tagging," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 53-63.
    13. Tayibov, Khayyam, 2024. "Tagging Birthplace for Optimal Tax Policy, Redistribution, and Welfare," Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 9/2024, Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
    14. Alves, Cassiano Breno Machado & Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, 2021. "Intrahousehold inequality and the joint taxation of household earnings," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 825, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    15. Takuya Obara & Yoshitomo Ogawa, 2020. "Optimal Taxation in an Endogenous Fertility Model with Non-Cooperative Couples," Discussion Paper Series 211, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jan 2021.
    16. Gerritsen, Aart, 2016. "Optimal taxation when people do not maximize well-being," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 122-139.
    17. Johannes Hermle & Andreas Peichl, 2018. "Jointly Optimal Taxes for Different Types of Income," CESifo Working Paper Series 7248, CESifo.
    18. Alves, Cassiano B. & da Costa, Carlos E. & Lobel, Felipe & Moreira, Humberto, 2024. "Intrahousehold inequality and the joint taxation of household earnings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; Tagging; Intra-household bargaining; H21; D13; J16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

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