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Gender-based and couple-based taxation

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  • Spencer Bastani

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the optimal taxation of singles and couples in an economy with bargaining couples. The government is concerned with the redistribution of income from individuals with high utility to individuals with low utility, recognizing that some individuals live in couple households where resources are unevenly distributed. I analyze how redistributive linear income taxes, which depend on either gender or household composition (or both) impact the distribution of utility within and across households. An interesting implication arising from the interaction between the model elements is that even though between-group lump-sum transfers always favor women, when the bargaining power of men is high, women are subject to a higher tax rate; this in contrast to previous analyses of gender-based taxation. My quantitative analysis demonstrates that the welfare effects of gender-based taxation are sizable and even larger when taxes depend on the composition of the household. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Spencer Bastani, 2013. "Gender-based and couple-based taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(4), pages 653-686, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:20:y:2013:i:4:p:653-686 DOI: 10.1007/s10797-013-9285-9
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    Cited by:

    1. Spencer Bastani & Jacob Lundberg, 2016. "Political Preferences for Redistribution in Sweden," CESifo Working Paper Series 6205, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Patricia Gallego-Granados & Johannes Geyer, 2015. "Distributional and Behavioral Effects of the Gender Wage Gap," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 753, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    3. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Maldonado, Dario & Roeder, Kerstin, 2016. "Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 454-470.
    4. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2016. "Public Pensions in a Multi-Period Mirrleesian Income Tax Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 6206, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Kanbur, Ravi & Tuomala, Matti, 2016. "Groupings and the gains from tagging," Research in Economics, Elsevier, pages 53-63.
    6. Carlsson, Mikael & Westermark, Andreas, 2016. "Endogenous Separations, Wage Rigidities and Employment Volatility," Working Paper Series 326, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    7. Gerritsen, Aart, 2016. "Optimal taxation when people do not maximize well-being," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 122-139.
    8. repec:kap:jecinq:v:15:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10888-017-9368-4 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; Tagging; Intra-household bargaining; H21; D13; J16;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

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