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Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction

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Author Info
Olivier Bargain ()
Miriam Beblo
Denis Beninger
Richard Blundell
Raquel Carrasco
Maria-Concetta Chiuri
François Laisney
Valérie Lechene
Nicolas Moreau
Michal Myck
Javier Ruiz-Castillo
Frederic Vermeulen

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A widely shared intuition holds that individual control over money matters for the decision process within the household and the subsequent distribution of resources and welfare. As a consequence, there are good reasons to depart from the unitary model of the household and to explore the possibilities offered by models of the family accounting for several decision makers in the household and for the potential impact of tax reforms on the balance of power. This paper summarizes both the methodological and empirical findings presented in the next three papers of this special issue of the Review of the Economics of the Household. This series of contributions primarily entails a concrete comparison of the policy implications of the choice between the unitary and a particular multi-person representation: the collective representation. On the one hand, it suggests a methodology to implement the collective model of labor supply in a realistic context where participation is modeled together with working hours, and where the full tax-benefit system is accounted for. On the other hand, the empirical part relies on comprehensive simulations of tax reforms in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and allows to quantify the distortions that may affect policy recommendations based on the unitary model. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11150-006-0001-8
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economics of the Household.

Volume (Year): 4 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 99-111
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Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:4:y:2006:i:2:p:99-111

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Related research
Keywords: Collective model; Household labor supply; Intra household allocations; Tax reform; D11; D12; J22;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Blundell, Richard & Chiappori, Pierre-André & Magnac, Thierry & Meghir, Costas, 2005. "Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," IDEI Working Papers 373, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1997. "Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 191-209, February.
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  9. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Luis Rubalcava & Duncan Thomas, 2000. "Family Bargaining and Welfare," Working Papers 00-10, RAND Corporation Publications Department. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Bargain, Olivier & Moreau, Nicolas, 2005. "Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1480, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  13. Maria Concetta Chiuri & Ernesto Longobardi, . "Welfare analysis of fiscal reforms in Europe: Does the representation of family decision processes matter? Evidence from Italy," series 0007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche - Università di Bari. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Schultz, T.P., 1990. "Testing The Neoclassical Model Of Family Labor Supply And Fertility," Papers 601, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  16. Frederic Vermeulen & Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck , 2006. "Collective Models of Labor Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 113-127, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Frederic Vermeulen, 2005. "And the winner is... An empirical evaluation of unitary and collective labour supply models," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 711-734, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Alderman, Harold, et al, 1995. "Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
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  24. Behrman, Jere R., 1993. "Intrahousehold distribution and the family," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 125-187 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  26. Lundberg, Shelly, 2005. "Men and islands: Dealing with the family in empirical labor economics," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 591-612, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
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  29. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2005. "Collective Labor Supply with Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(6), pages 1277-1306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  30. Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana Amyra & Neuman, Shoshana, 1988. "Women's Labor Supply and Marital Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1294-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  32. Frederic Vermeulen, 2002. "A collective model for female labour supply with nonparticipation and taxation," Public Economics Working Paper Series ces0214, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  33. Denis Beninger & Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Ernesto Longobardi & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck , 2006. "Evaluating the Move to a Linear Tax System in Germany and Other European Countries," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-180, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  36. Apps, Patricia F & Rees, Ray, 1997. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 178-90, February.
    Other versions:
  37. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-58, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Haan, Peter & Myck, Michal, 2008. "Multi-Family Households in a Labour Supply Model: A Calibration Method with Application to Poland," IZA Discussion Papers 3611, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Pierre-Carl Michaud & Frederic Vermeulen, 2006. "A Collective Labor Supply Model: Identification and Estimation in the Presence of Externalities by Means of Panel Data," Working Papers 406, RAND Corporation Publications Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Denis Beninger & François Laisney, 2006. "On the performance of unitary models of household labor supply estimated on “collective” data with taxation," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 81, pages 5-36. [Downloadable!]
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