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Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction

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Author Info

  • Olivier Bargain

    ()

  • Miriam Beblo
  • Denis Beninger
  • Richard Blundell
  • Raquel Carrasco
  • Maria-Concetta Chiuri
  • François Laisney
  • Valérie Lechene
  • Nicolas Moreau
  • Michal Myck
  • Javier Ruiz-Castillo
  • Frederic Vermeulen

Abstract

A widely shared intuition holds that individual control over money matters for the decision process within the household and the subsequent distribution of resources and welfare. As a consequence, there are good reasons to depart from the unitary model of the household and to explore the possibilities offered by models of the family accounting for several decision makers in the household and for the potential impact of tax reforms on the balance of power. This paper summarizes both the methodological and empirical findings presented in the next three papers of this special issue of the Review of the Economics of the Household. This series of contributions primarily entails a concrete comparison of the policy implications of the choice between the unitary and a particular multi-person representation: the collective representation. On the one hand, it suggests a methodology to implement the collective model of labor supply in a realistic context where participation is modeled together with working hours, and where the full tax-benefit system is accounted for. On the other hand, the empirical part relies on comprehensive simulations of tax reforms in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and allows to quantify the distortions that may affect policy recommendations based on the unitary model. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economics of the Household.

Volume (Year): 4 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 99-111

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Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:4:y:2006:i:2:p:99-111

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=109451

Related research

Keywords: Collective model; Household labor supply; Intra household allocations; Tax reform; D11; D12; J22;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Haan & Michał Myck, 2012. "Multi-family households in a labour supply model: a calibration method with application to Poland," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(22), pages 2907-2919, August.
  2. P. Chiappori, 2011. "Collective labor supply with many consumption goods," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 207-220, June.
  3. Shun-ichiro Bessho & Masayoshi Hayashi, 2013. "ntensive Margins, Extensive Margins, and Spousal Allowances in the Japanes e System of Personal Income Taxes: A Discrete Choice Analysis," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-912, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  4. Pierre-Carl Michaud & Frederic Vermeulen, 2006. "A Collective Labor Supply Model: Identification and Estimation in the Presence of Externalities by Means of Panel Data," Working Papers 406, RAND Corporation Publications Department.
  5. Hideo Akabayashi, 2006. "The labor supply of married women and spousal tax deductions in Japan—a structural estimation," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 349-378, December.
  6. Kurowska, Anna & Myck, Michal & Wrohlich, Katharina, 2012. "Family and Labor Market Choices: Requirements to Guide Effective Evidence-Based Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 6846, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Denis Beninger & François Laisney, 2006. "On the performance of unitary models of household labor supply estimated on “collective” data with taxation," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 81, pages 5-36.

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