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Rationalité individuelle ou rationalité stratégique : le cas de l'offre familiale de travail

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  • François Bourguignon

Abstract

[fre] Cet article analyse le statut des conditions de Slutsky dans le test de la rationalité des décisions d'offre de travail d'un ménage à deux membres. Il y est montré que ces conditions peuvent être satisfaites dans un modèle stratégique, fondamenta­lement différent de la maximisation d'une utilité collective, et que, inversement, elles ne sont pas toujours satisfaites, empiriquement, sous cette dernière hypothèse qui peut, dans ces conditions, être à considérer comme un postulat. [eng] Individual or strategic rationality : . The case of family labor supply. François Bourguignon. This paper explores the status of Slutsky conditions for testing the rationality of labor-supply decision-making in a two-members household. It is shown that those conditions may hold in a game-theoretic model, fundamentally distinct from the collective utility maximization assumption, and that, conversely, they may not be empirically satisfied under the latter assumption, which might thus be considered as a postulate.

Suggested Citation

  • François Bourguignon, 1984. "Rationalité individuelle ou rationalité stratégique : le cas de l'offre familiale de travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 35(1), pages 147-162.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1984_num_35_1_408771
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1984.408771
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1984.408771
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Bliss, Christopher & Stern, Nicholas, 1978. "Productivity, wages and nutrition : Part I: the theory," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 331-362, December.
    3. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    4. BARTEN, Anton P., 1967. "Evidence on the Slutsky conditions for demand equations," LIDAM Reprints CORE 8, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Moreau, 2001. "Approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 15(4), pages 145-185.
    2. Flinn, Christopher J. & Todd, Petra E & Zhang, Weilong, 2018. "Personality traits, intra-household allocation and the gender wage gap," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 191-220.
    3. Zweimuller, Josef & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf & Falkinger, Josef, 1996. "Retirement of spouses and social security reform," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 449-472, February.
    4. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castillo , 2006. "Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-111, June.
    5. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2011. "Revealed Preference Analysis of Non‐Cooperative Household Consumption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 1073-1096, September.
    6. Frederic Vermeulen, 2002. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 533-564, September.
    7. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces10.34, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    8. Dominique Goux & Eric Maurin & Barbara Petrongolo, 2014. "Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labor Supply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 252-276, January.
    9. Gimenez-Nadal, José Ignacio & Molina, José Alberto, 2020. "The Gender Gap in Time Allocation in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 13461, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Molina, José Alberto & Gimenez-Nadal, José Ignacio & Velilla, Jorge, 2018. "Intertemporal Labor Supply: A Household Collective Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 11276, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2006. "Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-14, March.
    12. Laurens Cherchye & Sam Cosaert & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2020. "Group Consumption with Caring Individuals," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(627), pages 587-622.
    13. Donni, Olivier, 2006. "Les modèles non coopératifs d’offre de travail : théorie et évidence," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 181-206, mars-juin.
    14. Pierre André Chiappori & José Ignacio Gimenez Nadal & José Alberto Molina & Alexandros Theloudis & Jorge Velilla, 2020. "Intrahousehold Commitment and Intertemporal Labor Supply," LISER Working Paper Series 2020-11, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER).
    15. Gimenez-Nadal, Jose Ignacio & Molina, José Alberto, 2021. "How do women allocate their available time in Europe? Differences with men," GLO Discussion Paper Series 908, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    16. Lucia Mangiavacchi & Chiara Rapallini, 2014. "Self-Reported Economic Condition And Home Production: Intra-Household Allocation In Italy," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 279-304, July.
    17. repec:eee:labchp:v:1:y:1986:i:c:p:103-204 is not listed on IDEAS

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