Collective and unitary models: a clarification
AbstractIn this note we identify and clarify a confusion that has arisen in the literature about the exact relationship between unitary and collective models and what enters the Pareto weight and the sharing function. We suggest that we should denote as `unitary` any model that leads to outcomes that satisfy the Slutsky conditions whether or not these outcomes depend on distribution factors. In particular, income pooling is neither necessary nor sufficient for a unitary model. We also show that the presence of prices or total expenditure in the sharing rule cannot be used as a test for a unitary model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 191.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2004
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Unitary; Collective; Intrahousehold Allocation; Distribution Factors; Demand.;
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- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
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