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A nonparametric revealed preference test of optimal intra-firm resource allocation

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  • Jonathan Seaton

Abstract

The collective rationality hypothesis initiated by Chiappori (1988a) and applied by Seaton (1997, 2001) for a two-person household is used to distinguish the organizational behaviour of firms. Firms produce satisfaction to groups as traditional managerial and early behavioural theories of the firm of Williamson, Baumol and Marris suggest, as well as more modern principle agent models. Under certain conditions, intra-firm bargaining leads to a Pareto optimal outcome. What makes this work an important contribution is that it identifies a set of nonvacuous testable restrictions to empirically detect if firm-level data satisfy Pareto optimal behaviour for the main decision makers in the organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Seaton, 2009. "A nonparametric revealed preference test of optimal intra-firm resource allocation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(27), pages 3463-3476.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:41:y:2009:i:27:p:3463-3476
    DOI: 10.1080/00036840701537836
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