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Kinky Choices, Dictators and Split Might: A Non-Cooperative Model for Household Consumption and Labor Supply

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Author Info
Boone, Jan () (Tilburg University)
van der Wiel, Karen () (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
Vermeulen, Frederic () (Tilburg University)

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Abstract

It is unlikely that husbands and wives always agree on exactly what public goods to buy. Nor do they necessarily agree on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor supply behavior of a couple in a non-cooperative setting by adopting a Nash approach. Using minimal assumptions, we prove that demand for public goods is characterized by three regimes. It is either determined by the preferences of one of the partners only (Husband Dictatorship or Wife Dictatorship), or by both spouses' preferences where a partner's influence depends on the spouses' relative wage rates (Split Might). These regimes imply a kinked nature of the couple's aggregate demand curves. By imposing more structure on the model, we can derive testable implications on observed demand for public goods and labor supply that allow testing the model against the standard unitary model where a couple behaves as a single decision maker. The model is applied to a sample drawn from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) whereby we explicitly focus on expenses on children's goods that act as a public good in the spouses' preferences. We find that for couples with two or three children the standard unitary model is strongly rejected in favor of our non-cooperative model. Moreover, it turns out that for the majority of these couples, there is a Wife Dictatorship in the sense that the spending pattern is according to her preferences.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4272.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4272

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Related research
Keywords: consumption; labor supply; intra-household allocation; non-cooperative model; public goods;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Attanasio, Orazio & Davis, Steven J, 1996. "Relative Wage Movements and the Distribution of Consumption," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1227-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Browning, Martin, 2000. " The Saving Behaviour of a Two-Person Household," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(2), pages 235-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Deaton, Angus & Paxson, Christina, 1994. "Intertemporal Choice and Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Attanasio, Orazio P & Weber, Guglielmo, 1995. "Is Consumption Growth Consistent with Intertemporal Optimization? Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1121-57, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Cherchye, Laurens & Vermeulen, Frederic, 2006. "Nonparametric analysis of household labor supply: goodness-of-fit and power of the unitary and the collective model," Discussion Paper 13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  9. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
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  10. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2005. "Collective Labor Supply with Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(6), pages 1277-1306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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