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Non cooperative household demand

Author

Listed:
  • Valérie Lechene

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)

  • Ian Preston

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)

Abstract

We study non cooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against non cooperative alternatives and the non cooperative model against a general alternative.

Suggested Citation

  • Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2010. "Non cooperative household demand," IFS Working Papers W10/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:10/18
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Intra-household allocation; Slutsky symmetry.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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