Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alesina, Alberto

    ()
    (Harvard University)

  • Ichino, Andrea

    ()
    (European University Institute)

  • Karabarbounis, Loukas

    ()
    (Harvard University)

Abstract

Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey’s optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of (married) women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and primitive. But in this paper we also explore differences in gender elasticities which emerge endogenously in a model in which spouses bargain over the allocation of home duties. GBT changes spouses’ implicit bargaining power and induces a more balanced allocation of house work and working opportunities between males and females. Because of decreasing returns to specialization in home and market work, social welfare improves by taxing conditional on gender. When income sharing within the family is substantial, both spouses may gain from GBT.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp3233.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3233.

as in new window
Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2011, 3 (2), 1-40
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3233

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: family economics; economics of gender; optimal taxation; elasticity of labor supply;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Shelly J. Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(3), pages 463-480.
  2. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  3. Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the Household," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 3411, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Kleven, Henrik & Kreiner, Claus Thustrup & Saez, Emmanuel, 2006. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5978, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-78, June.
  6. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, 2006. "Gender roles and technological progress," 2006 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 411, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Alberto Alesina & Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2005. "Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?," NBER Working Papers 11278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Albanesi, Stefania & Olivetti, Claudia, 2005. "Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  10. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  11. Alberto Alesina & Paola Giuliano, 2007. "The Power of the Family," NBER Working Papers 13051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Blundell, Richard & Macurdy, Thomas, 1999. "Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1559-1695 Elsevier.
  13. Claudia Goldin, 2006. "The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women's Employment, Education, and Family," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 1-21, May.
  14. Browning, M. & Bourguignon, F. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Incomes and Outcomes: A structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 92-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  15. John Piggott & John Whalley, 1994. "The Tax Unit and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 4820, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1972. "The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 97-119, April.
  17. Andrea Ichino & Enrico Moretti, 2006. "Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap," NBER Working Papers 12369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  19. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S11-S26, Part II, .
  20. Patricia F. Apps & Ray Rees, 1999. "Individual versus Joint Taxation in Models with Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(2), pages 393-403, April.
  21. Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburg & Adrien Verdelhan, 2007. "The Wealth-Consumption Ratio: A Litmus Test for Consumption-based Asset Pricing Models¤," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics WP2007-030, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  22. Martin Browning & P.A. Chiappori, 1996. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations - A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 96-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  23. Rolf Aaberge & Ugo Colombino, 2008. "Designing Optimal Taxes with a Microeconometric Model of Household Labour Supply," CHILD Working Papers, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY wp06_08, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  24. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 1999. "On the taxation of trade within and between households," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 241-263, August.
  25. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, 2005. "Changes in the Labor Supply Behavior of Married Women: 1980-2000," NBER Working Papers 11230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, 2007. "Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time over Five Decades," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 122(3), pages 969-1006, 08.
  27. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June.
  28. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2007. "The Taxation of Couples," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University 559, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
  29. Pollak, Robert, 2007. "Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 3109, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  30. Leora Friedberg & Anthony Webb, 2006. "Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2006-13, Center for Retirement Research, revised Jun 2006.
  31. Vermeulen, F.M.P., 2002. "Collective household models: Principles and main results," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3106943, Tilburg University.
  32. Thomas, D., 1989. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center 586, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  33. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  34. Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983. "Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April.
  35. Brett, Craig, 1998. "Tax reform and collective family decision-making," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 425-440, December.
  36. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew C. Weinzierl, 2009. "The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution," Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School 09-139, Harvard Business School.
  37. Peter Gottfried & Wolfram Richter, 1999. "The Tax Unit and Household Production: Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(2), pages 404-409, April.
  38. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March.
  39. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "Tagging and Income Taxation: Theory and an Application," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 31-50, February.
  40. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  41. Becker, Gary S, 1985. "Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages S33-58, January.
  42. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April.
  43. Alexander Gelber, 2008. "Taxation and Family Labor Supply," 2008 Meeting Papers 249, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  44. Elisabeth Gugl, 2009. "Income splitting, specialization, and intra-family distribution," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(3), pages 1050-1071, August.
  45. Gelber, Alexander, 2010. "Taxation and the Earnings of Husbands and Wives," MPRA Paper 20345, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  46. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Gender based taxation
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-02-21 03:09:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Economic Logic blog

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3233. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.