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Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation

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  • Pollak, Robert

    ()
    (Washington University, St. Louis)

Abstract

Does joint taxation disadvantage women? To answer that question, this paper begins by reviewing unitary and bargaining models of intrafamily allocation, and then discusses the determinants of "bargaining power" in a world without taxes. It argues that wage rates rather than earnings are determinants of bargaining power, and then argues that productivity in household production is also a source of bargaining power. In the absence of human capital effects, joint taxation does not appear to disadvantage women in either divorce threat or separate spheres bargaining. Hence, the claim that joint taxation disadvantages women, if it is correct, depends on effects that operate through the incentives to accumulate human capital. But a satisfactory analysis of the effects of taxation on human capital awaits the further development of dynamic models of family bargaining.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3109.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: CESifo Economic Studies, 2011, 57 (2), 216-244
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3109

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Keywords: household production; family bargaining; joint taxation;

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References

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  1. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, . "Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis," Working Papers, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University 2132862, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  2. Konrad, K.A. & Lommerud, K.E., 2000. "The Bargaining Family Revisited," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen 212, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  3. Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December.
  4. T. Paul Schultz, 1990. "Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 599-634.
  5. Liliana E. Pezzin & Robert A. Pollak & Barbara S. Schone, 2007. "Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents," CESifo Working Paper Series 1908, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 2001. "Efficiency in Marriage," NBER Working Papers 8642, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  8. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington 94-6, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  9. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  10. Richard H. Thaler, 2008. "Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 15-25, 01-02.
  11. Thomas, D., 1989. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center 586, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  12. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May.
  13. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  14. Robert A. Pollak, 2002. "Gary Becker's Contributions to Family and Household Economics," NBER Working Papers 9232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  16. James J. Heckman & Lance Lochner & Christopher Taber, 1998. "General Equilibrium Treatment Effects: A Study of Tuition Policy," NBER Working Papers 6426, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  18. Saku Aura, 2002. "Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Missouri 0217, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  19. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  20. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Pollak, Robert A, 1988. "Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 240-44, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bell, Clive & Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T., 2010. "Raising Juveniles," IZA Discussion Papers 5036, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 1-40, May.
  3. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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